The Free Market Center
The Free Market Center
Although this scenario seems like a simple inverse of the preceding scenario, I think you will find some interesting differences in the effect that changes in the quantity of money have on money prices.
You should set these values before the first simulation, and leave them during succeeding simulations in this scenario.
It seems that our little—two-product—economy has entered a depression. Sales decline steadily, and direct exchange prices and money prices consistently indicate that fact.
Now, this model does not accommodate additional actors, but consider the inclination of other producers entering this market when prices rise continually.
Let's see what happens when the system throws more money at the situation.
Make the appropriate adjustment to the annual fractional money increase rate and rerun the simulation.
Some might argue that, if rising prices send a signal to outsiders to bring products into the market, won't faster rising prices create an even greater incentive? Does this amount to monetary stimulus?
Yes, the false signals might bring more production to this market. But, in the long-run, does that have a positive effect on this economy?
If producers respond to flawed signals, might they over-produce those products that demonstrate excessively rapid money price increases? Might this "stimulation" create a "boom" that precedes the next "bust?"
Let's look at deflation.
Make the appropriate adjustment to the annual fractional money increase rate and rerun the simulation.
This simulation gives us a glimpse of the dangerous sort of deflation: a contraction in the money supply causing downward pressure on prices.
If we isolate on shoe prices, we see, during the period of the deflation, prices that should rise actually decline. The market received signals of relative excess in spite of relative shortage in actual sales.
Note: The price declines caused by increased production (see the fixed money simulation) reflects the strength of the product in the market. Price declines caused by money deflation send false, and dangerous, signals to the market.
Fed Chairman Bernanke needs to understand the difference.
Rising money prices for both products give a clear indication that the production and sales of both products also increase during this simulation.
When production and sales decline, money prices should increase at a rate inversely related to the rate of sales decrease. An increasing money supply, however, will cause money prices to rise faster than in the case of a fixed money supply. The accelerated money price increases will indicates relative shortages greater than actually exist.
When the money supply declines it has a negative influence on the natural money price increases. It will either retard or reverse the normal trend. In this case, the rise in shoe prices slows and the rise in wheat prices reverses and declines. These trends give false signal that indicates either relative shortages less than actually exist or relative abundance when actually relative shortages exist.
We have now seen how, in the context of either decreasing production and sales, changes in the money supply can have a dramatic influence on the price signals received by the market.
As the ones who set the parameters for this model we know beforehand that sales and production are declining. The market has continually less of both products as time progresses. Market observers, however, generally must take their cues from the dollar prices. With a fixed quantity of money prices rise in relation to the relative supply of the goods, giving accurate signals to which the market can respond. When the money supply increases, prices indicate relative shortages greater than actually exist. When the money supply declines, the relative shortage of shoes appears less than actual, and the relative shortage of wheat appears to have reversed.
© 2010—2020 The Free Market Center & James B. Berger. All rights reserved.
To contact Jim Berger, e-mail:
© 2010—2024 The Free Market Center
& James B. Berger. All rights reserved.
To contact Jim Berger, e-mail:
© 2010—2020 The Free Market Center & James B. Berger. All rights reserved.
To contact Jim Berger, e-mail: